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THE BAROMETER is a student bi-weekly newspaper for the exchange 
of Ideas and information concerning the development and improvement 
of the professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Items of interest, papers, and articles of interest to the students, 
staff, and faculty as a whole are solicited. 
#*#*#*#*#*#*#*#*# 
liAs in a building, which, however fair and beautiful the 
superstructure, Is radically marred and imperfect if the 
foundation be insecure-so, If the strategy be wrong the 
skill of the general on the battlefield, the valor of the 
soldier, the brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, 
fail of their effect." MAHAN, Naval Administration and Warfare, 1908 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: The following excerpts were taken from the recently completed Naval 
Officer Professional Development Study headed by Vice Admiral M. G. Bayne. The first 
selection is an open letter to all officers concerning professional development. The 
second selection is a letter from Admiral Hyman Rickover expressing his views on profession-
al development. The BAROMETER urges all of its readers to scrutinize both of these 
articles carefully. In our opinion this may be the most significant, and thought 
provoking reading, you may do at the Postgraduate School. 
NOTES ON CAREER PLANNING FOR ALL NAVAL OFFICERS: 
"This open letter, intended to be read. by all officers of the Navy at any stage in 
their careers, discusses the various decision points faced by a Navy professional as 
attempts are made to match personal interests with Navy needs. At several career points 
the officer must come to a conscious judgment regarding the career path to be sought; 
the assignments to be requested, and the training or education required to fulfill the 
chosen career path. These decisions are not all clearly visible. They are not driven 
by a series of career qualifications which can be checked off, and so insure promot-
ability or even assignability. Just as is true in all other professions, they require 
an intelligent blending of past experience, developed equity and interest in the mission 
of the organization, loyalty to the profession and advice from informed sources in the 
naval establ~shment. These sources include commanding officers, career counselors, 
detailers and professional literature. The blend gradually into a decision which at 
the career point in question is the best judgment to be made at that time to satisfy 
the needs of the Navy and interests of the officer. Where these two factors are in 
complete harmony, professional success is always assured. Where they differ, compromises 
must be made. 
It is essential that the career officer understand that these compromises cannot be 
weighed to heavily in favor of individual desires. The needs of the Service, its 
personnel constraints, the billets to be filled, the fact that the Service is mission-
oriented; all are necessary ingredients of this understanding. The word 'Service
' 
is the 
key. A professional naval officer serves the country and the Navy. The country and 
the Navy serve the officer, but only to the degree that they sense the officer's higher 
order of service in the first place. 
This priority of responsibility in Service is sometimes misunderstood in today's 
modern society. For the military professional to misunderstand it will result in lack 
of professional contribution and consequently diminution of success. It is necessary, 
then, that the officer's career be developed along lines of, first, determining personal 
basic interests which match best the needs of the Service; second, fortifying by training 
and education those interests to the best of his or her ability, and third, seeking 
opportunities to serve in areas which allow these fortified abil ities to be best utilized. 
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We speak here of a commissioned officer who has entered the Navy from the Naval 
Academy or a civilian academIc source, who has a baccalaureate degree and has not 
rejected the notion that the Navy Is a possible career. 
As an Ensign there Is the Immediate basic decision as to specialty. The officer 
must decide whether personal Interests lie in service In the operational or the support 
areas of the Navy. If the choice Is the unrestricted line (URl) , the officer faces a 
further choice as to warfare specialty: surface, air or subsurface. If the choice is 
in the support area, a further choice must then be made, Involving the area in which 
service is desired. In selecting a support path, the officer automatically further 
chooses to serve In a managerial or technical role rather than an operational command 
role. 
As in aI' future decisions, the area of first preference may not be available. If 
it is, the path for a period of time Is easily determined by the training received 
afloat in warfare specialty training, or ashore In school, or on the job. If the officer 
is not accepted In the area of first choice, he or she faces, as always, the question, 
'Are my interests In the Navy based solely on acceptance Into a particular program, or 
is some alternate program compatible with my goals?' 
In whatever specialty chosen or accepted, the officer receives necessary basic training 
and experience In this specialty, and as he or she acquIres experience, equity and 
interest in that specialty develop. 
At the junior grade lieutenant, or lieutenant grade level again the officer is faced 
with iddntlfylng Interests, this time terms of possible education. At this point, 
through counseling, official notices, talks with other officers, and discussions with 
commanding officers concerning options available, a realization will occur that there are 
a number of interesting billets within the Navy which require education above the 
baccalaureate. These billets number between five and six thousand and require a base of 
ten to twelve thousand specially educated officers to keep them filled. Some academic 
disciplines required In these billets are more popular than others. In these, more 
officers exist with the necessary education than there are billets to fill, and In the 
less popular areas, there are billets requiring advanced education with an insufficient 
number of officers to fill them. Generally, the technical academic disciplines such 
as aero engineering, ship engineering and computer technology are less likely to have a 
plentiful supply of educated officers than are the billets requiring advanced education 
in management, the social sciences, International relations or political science. Again 
a decision Is necessary. 
If the officer's undergraduate educational experience has been rewarding, if the 
energy, ability, and interest to seek graduate education is highly developed, and if 
there interests match the Navy's advanced education needs, the officer may expect to be 
selected for fully funded study In one of these disciplines. If not selected for graduate 
education on a fully funded basis, again a decision must be made. There are two options 
available: To seek graduate education (In an off-duty status) on own time or to forego 
graduate education as a dispensable Item. In making this decision the officer should 
consider that about 54 percent of the Flag Officers and Captains in today's Navy have 
graduate degrees, and a realistic conclusion is that a graduate degree, while a 
significant asset, is not an indispensable ticket to either promotion or assignment in 
the Navy. 
However. study at the graduate level Is an invaluable means by which to stay abreast 
of technological and sociological advances and to overcome the obsolescence of knowledge 
syndrome. Officers who have the requislt advantage of off-duty time may well wish to 
take advantage of the many Intellectual opportunities which tuition assistance and 
Veterans benefits provide them. 
The officer who has been selected for the graduate education chosen again follows a ~ 
clear path. The officer not selected should seek additional experience in his specialty; 
and if an URl officer, strengthen the purely operational career pattern. All qualified 
URL officers must seek the ultimate payoff In the Navy profession, that of operational 
command. 
At a somewhat later time in the career, as a lieutenant Commander or Commander, the 
officer faces screening for selection for a junior service college or the Armed Forces 
Staff College; for executive officer or command afloat, for staff assignments in areas 
of personal interest, or Increased experience or education. The officer mayor may not 
be given the assignment personally though necessary for a particular career pattern, 
and success mayor may not have been achieved In screening for the executive/command 
level. The male officer may have determined that his Interests and special skills are 
sufficiently developed to request transfer to the Restricted line, and If accepted enters 
a narrower professional field; thus, virtually giving up an opportunity for naval command 
at the highest level . 
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At the Lieutenant Commander-Commander level the " warfare specialties of the male 
unrestricted line officer have become highly developed, and the subspecialty which he 
may have achieved by education, experience or both is becoming increasingly identifiable. 
The specialties of officers in the support areas have also been highly developed by this 
time. Assignments to large staffs, assignments in Washington, D.C., assignments to one 
of the senior service colleges, can become a part of the career pattern at this juncture, 
and again a part of the selection process to be faced. In each instance, when selection 
for the desired assignment does not occur, other options and other paths must be 
considered and the best match made between personal interests and the needs of the 
Service. These can continue to Include off-duty education correspondence course work, 
or gain, in some cases, fully funded academic education where a clear match is achieved 
between needs and interests. 
At each decision point where the officer's detailing request has been met, the 
educational request has been met, the Interests and the assignments have matched, the 
path is clearer than when these matches have not occurred. At the Lieutenant Commander-
Commander level, promotion attrition becomes more severe, and achievement levels or 
plateaus begin to take shape In career planning. It Is sometimes very difficult for an 
officer not selected for promotion, or for the assignment sought, or the education 
personally felt necessary, to overcome a sense of failure at this point. It Is easy 
to say that failure has not occurred, and It Is a truism that it has not. Yet for the 
officer to continue as a responsible and contributing member of the naval profession 
an inner feeling must exist that achievement at this level is important, and that 
what is being accomplished Is a job required by the Navy. 
Since the Navy is a closed organization It cannot avoid the competition within the 
promotional and assignment systems. The Navy does not hire individuals at various levels 
of achievement or education to fill jobs that it needs filled, as is done by many other 
sectors of our society. It must fill these assignments by promotion and assignment from 
within. As the executive or policy level Is reached, quite obviously there are fewer 
assignments available, and the attrition becomes even more severe. This happens in all 
of mankind's relationships with mankind. There is nothing unusual about this and there 
should be no stigma or sense of failure attached when an individual reaches that level 
of performance and contribution which is natural for him. In the military, uniforms 
are worn and badges of office are readily visible. To some they represent the attitudes 
of success or failure, since they relate directly to promotion and assignment. This 
makes achievement of a personal pateau more difficult to understand and, in some cases, 
to accept. 
The officer who has succeeded in matching personal interests with Navy needs will 
be the officer most likely to feel complete job s~tisfactlon. The officer who attempts 
to match the needs of the Navy to personal interests, where such a match does not exist, 
will feel frustration, and ultimately a sense of failure. 
At various points the question must be asked; Whether or not he or she is still in 
the running? The answers come in various ways' for some quite positively in terms of 
past fitness reports, assignment patterns, educational background and experience; for 
others more hesitatingly when they can detect examples where interests and needs did not 
always match; and for others negatively, where they can poInt to a career path which 
has not matched personal interests at all. Yet, all humanly react to these answers, some 
spurred on by constant encouragement, others discouraged by disappointments, others 
motivated to correct past errors. It is through this process that officers sometimes 
decide to leave the Navy, assessing their possTbilltles of contribution as something 
less than their won Idea of success. 
If promotional statistics are used as the criterion for success, an officer can 
clearly say that once selected to Commander, the odds have been beaten since the 
cumulative percentage promotion opportunity to Commander is about 50 percent. A male 
Ensign entering a naval career can realistTcally anticipate a 1.6 percentage opportunlt-
for promotion to Rear Admiral. So, If promotion to Flag rank is the only criterion for 
a successful carrer, there must be an admission at the outset that the odds for achieving 
the success are small. Fortunately, this is not the only true criterion for success. 
Contribution, achievement, job satisfaction, continuing Intellectual stimulation, are 
possible at all levels of the promotional ladder, and a naval career should be viewed in 
this light. 
There is no absolute promotional path within the Navy, nor should there be. The 
officer who over the years best identifie~ personal Interests as matching the require-
ments for fulfilling naval assignments, and amplifies those interests by experience and 
education, Is the officer most likely to continue progress in a naval career. The path 
is competitive; there Is no single criterion for achlevement--not graduate degree, not 
particular specialty, not a specific combination of specialty and subspecialty assignments, 
not assignment to a service college--but a recognition that a proper blending of these 
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elements into a career path, results at regular intervals along that path in identifying 
officers who have contributed more effectively than others to the dynamic needs of the 
Navy. This is as true of all society as It is true of the military. 
'Simply stated those who seek to serve will serve best'." 
"MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF THE NAVAL OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDY 
SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON NAVAL OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
This is in response to your letter of April 30, 1974 in which you summarized the interim 
results of your Naval Officer Professional Development Study and solicited my comments. 
Professional development as used in your study refers to the in-service formal training 
and education of naval officers as they progress through a naval career. 
I am providing you with detailed comments on the contents of your letter. These comments 
vary little from those I have made over the past ten years on this subject before 
various congressional committees. You indicate that you have read those reports. 
Before commenting in detail, I must make several observations on the broader issues 
involved. First, over the past 15 years I have witnessed a plethora of studies on the 
education of naval officers. They were all done by well-intentioned peoply and they have 
generally concluded that drastic changes are needed if the taxpayer's money is not to be 
squandered on useless training. These thick, well-written reports are filed away until 
the next study is called for. Unless and until those empowered to correct the situation 
are willing to take a hard and unpopular (within the service) position and force necessary 
changes, nothing will occur except continued studies. 
Second, the task of correcting the existing situation is made almost impossible because 
there is no one in the Navy who is totally responsible for this area. It is too easy 
for the heads of various agencies in the Navy to exercise partial authority, yet offer 
as an excuse their inability to effect change because it is 'someone else's' responsibility. 
In your letter you point out that the FY 75 budget for naval education and training is 
1.7 billion dollars. From comments I have made before congressional committees, you 
will see that I consider the in-service training and education of naval officers is one 
of the most abused areas of governmental expenditure when viewed from a value received 
standpoint. I support any effort to get proper control over the various programs which 
provide this education and training. You can also see from my testimony that I approve 
of advanced training as a means to increase an officer's professional ability, but I do 
not subscribe to providing any education of training simply to enhance an individual 
officer's ability to compete successfully for promotion as a lure to keep him in the 
service, or to train him for a job outside the Navy. Unfortunately, these latter reasons 
for providing advanced education prevail today and I see little effort within the Navy 
to change them. 
You indicated in your letter that your study was divided into three areas: Functional 
Training, Service Colleges and Post Graduate Education. My comments are divided to 
correspond with these areas are are summarized in the conclusion. 
Functional Training 
In my opinion, this is the area in which the major expenditure in time, effort, and money 
should be made. Specific training for a specific assignment should be used to a far 
greater extent in all areas because it offers the greatest direct return to the service. 
Nuclear power training, aviation and submarine training are examples which have been 
reasonably successful over the years. But, I would caution you that too often, the 
functional training actually given the Navy amounts to little more than superficial 
indoctrination courses which are neither challenging, rigorous, or useful. Functional 
training of this type is of little value and I do not support it. 
I suspect you will find that few if any officers fail these courses, and this should prompt 
a skeptical appraisal of the value of this type of training. You remark in other sections 
of your letter that nuclear-trained officers apparently benefit professionally from their 
functional nuclear power training, but one pOint which you might consider in ~his regard 
is that the majority of the officers undergoing this training must personally exert them-
selves if they are to succeed in passing the courses. By doing so, they upgrade their 
individual capability, potential and worth to the Navy. This could be made the case in 
all Navy schools; doing so would have a beneficial effect on the quality of the officer 
corps. 
Easy indoctrination courses are not the answer to increased professional development and 
are a waste of time, especially, if, as you say you have found, the requirements for 
attendance are inconsistently applied and loosely administered. I agree with your 
efforts to get the specific training requirements identified and followed consistently. 
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You should also recommend that those responsible for this training make their courses 
more rigorou" in content and in administration. To do so •• chanisms IIlJst be established 
for close control of the various curricula and for the quality of the instruction. Both 
of these areas receive extensive attention in the nuclear pOwer training program and I 
consider them fundamental to any sort of proper instruction. The gathering of all 
functional training data into one source document will accomplish nothing unless there 
is centralized responsibility for administering the courses and for assuring their quality. 
Service Colleges 
Service colleges are worth their expense and effort only if they develop selected hifh 
quality officers into higher quality officers ready to assume leading roles in the eet 
or In the Navy Department. Your letter confirms my view that this is not the way officers 
are being selected, nor the courses used in this way. 
You cite the inability to get top performers into the service colleges because they are 
in demand elsewhere. This proves minimal need of present service college instruction; 
your statement that service college graduates have not been consistently selected for 
promotion merely proves the point. Clearly these courses have been kept full 'by assigning 
less capable officers who were not in demand elsewhere. I suspect this has been done 
primarily to justify the service college as an institution and to give the excuse for 
maintaining the faculty. The Tesults you cite with respect to promotion show that there 
is no way to elevate and average performer into a front-runner simply by providing him 
with a year's sabbatical leave at the college of his choice. 
r suggest that you consider recommending that only officers with top performance records 
be eligible for assignment to the service colleges and. if there are not enough officers 
to fill a given course, then schedules should be rearranged, dropping classes where 
necessary. I recognize ' that this practice will be at cross-purposes with the ability 
to justify the large faculties and expensive facilities which now exist. and on that 
basis, I doubt it would be acceptable to the Navy. 
Post Graduate Education 
Post graduate education in the Navy also suffers from a lack of consideration for the needs 
of the service and an overabundance of concern for the desires of the individual officer. 
However, the degree and the effect in the post graduate area are an order of magnitude 
more severe. Annually, the Navy is wasting many millions of dollars and many officers by 
providing them with the ability to ask for more money in their job-hunting after they 
retire or resign. This is being done under the semblance of upgrading or developing the 
intellectual capability of the officer corps. The Navy could get along with 15 to 20 
percent fewer officers if we stopped this non-sensical education. 
You say you have trimmed the Navy's requirements for officers with advanced degrees back 
from just over 6000 to about 5100. In my opinion 5100 is still an order of magnitude too 
many. I have never seen the need for any naval officer to have a doctoral degree, 
regardless of his area of specialization, and I have spoken out consistently against it; 
but I note that some 168 PhD's were on active duty as of 1 January of this year. I 
suspect your investigation will show many more currently in training. There is no possible 
way that such extravagance and mis-use of officers can be justified. 
You should take another hard look at the requirements for post graduate degrees. even at 
the masters level. I suggest you determine who sets the requirements for the degrees 
and whether of not the justifications are valid. I am sure you will find that in many 
cases the requirement was stated by an incumbent who was more interested in justifying 
his own educational achievement than by one who really knew the job and made an objective 
analysis of the credentials needed to fill it. 
I agree with recognition of education beyond the baccalaureate level and below the masters 
~ level, but r believe this recognition already exists. Officers in this category have 
obviously recognized the requirement to develop themselves further and have done so on 
their own time without the promise of a gilt-edged degree to sue for their later benefit. 
More likely than not, an officer inclined to develop himself is a strong performer 
professionally, and is ahead of his group in that area. The rigorous functional training 
that I urged above falls well into this category. 
I can see no reason why the presence or absence of an advanced degree is used' to 
differentiate between officers for selection. Selection criteria should be based on 
performance, and performance alone. 
You are correct in your assessment of my remarks before congress that I agreee with post 
graduate education for a limited number of naval officers. I positively do nnt agree 
from my experience, that wholesale application of post graduate education will produce 
a better officer corps, and I strongly disagree with sending young officers for graduate 
training immediately upon commissioning. Officers should be considered for 'post graduate 
assignment only after a good seasoning period at sea and then only if they have demonstrated 
.. . .... 
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that they have the necessary potential to excel. Such post graduate assignments should 
not be the 'right' of every officer, as is presently the case. The needs of the Navy, 
not the desire of the officer should be paramount. This potential for excellence need 
not be limited to command at sea but should also apply to other positions consistent 
with the needs of the Navy. There should also be good indication that officers ordered 
to post graduate school intend to make the Navy a career. 
In the recent past, there has apparently been a problem - similar to the one you cite for 
service colleges - with making first-rate officers available for post graduate training. 
I am sure that in order to protect the institution, specifically the Monterey school, 
officers whose records would not otherwise support such an assignment have been used to 
justify its existence. I do not mean to imply that the officers assigned during this 
period may not possess the academic credentials, although this may well be the case, but 
rather that their future worth to the Navy is less than that of their contemporaries who 
were in greater demand at sea and in key jobs elsewhere. This practice, I feel, is 
indefensible on the part of the Navy and it supports a contention I have made for some 
time - that the Navy should give up the Monterey School and do all of its post graduate -. 
work at private colleges and universities. This proposal despite the saving of funds and 
the better education made available, has never been acceptable to the Navy because it 
means letting go of another established institution and a comfortable faculty. However, 
I cannot conceive of a situation where the nation's academic capacity for post graduate 
study would be inadequate to support the needs of the Navy. This assumes, of course, 
that even those needs are carefully assessed and found to be valid. 
Professional development for an officer means gaining the ability to handle increasingly 
demanding and responsible jobs, becoming thereby of steadily increasing value to the 
service. Professional development through formal education alone must never be allowed 
to dictate promotional preference, nor should it be considered the inherent right of 
every officer. Conversely, professional development should be considered the 
responsibili¥t of every officer and his needs and desires must be kept carefully 
separated.ese needs and desires must be biased heavily in favor of the needs of 
the service. Formal education offered purely as an incentive for an extension of service 
commitment will surely attract precisely the opposite individual to the one desired. 
On the other hand, strong and well-run formal education programs must be available to 
assist officers to develop themselves. 
Based on these views, I have the following recommendations: 
- Establish clear requirements for officer functional training. Codify these require-
ments so as to establish centralized and responsible control over curriculum, quality 
of instruction and funds. 
- Provide for strict quality assurance monitoring of all functional training by 
establishing a group or groups, separate from the naval ' training organization, chartered 
to comment critically on curriculum, quality of instruction and all other phases of the 
training program. 
- Limit service college enrollment to top performing, high potential officers regard., 
less of the impact on the desires of the specific officers or the ability to justify 
expensive teaching facilities. 
- Require past graduate selection boards to select officers for post graduate school 
based on the need to fill specific billets, a list of which could be provided annually 
by the Chief of Naval Personnel. This would assure that all officers in post graduate 
school are earmarked for a specific assignment on completion of their schooling and that 
their advanced training is actually utilized. 
- Phase out the Post Graduate School at Monterey, using instead, civilian institutions. 
Stated simply, officer professional development must serve the ~ first and the officer 
second. Until this is done consistently, there can be no justification for its present 
high and needless cost. 
lsI H. G. RICKOVER 
H. G. RICKOVER. Director 
Division of Naval Reactors" 
.-. 
